Information-gathering: From sensor data to decision support in three simple steps by Wickler, Gerhard & Potter, Stephen
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information-gathering: From sensor data to decision support in
three simple steps
Citation for published version:
Wickler, G & Potter, S 2009, 'Information-gathering: From sensor data to decision support in three simple
steps' Intelligent Decision Technologies, vol 3, no. 1, pp. 3-17. DOI: 10.3233/IDT-2009-0043
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3233/IDT-2009-0043
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Intelligent Decision Technologies
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2017
 1
Information-Gathering: From Sensor Data to Decision 
Support in Three Simple Steps 
Gerhard Wickler and Stephen Potter 
{g.wickler|s.potter}@ed.ac.uk 
Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute,  
School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh 
Appleton Tower, Crichton Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9LE 
Scotland, UK 
Tel/Fax: +44 131 650 2732/6513 
Abstract 
In this paper we describe the information-gathering problem which can be characterized 
as transforming large amounts of data obtained from sensors into accurate, concise, 
timely and meaningful information that can be used by decision makers faced with a 
specific task and a number of options for performing that task. The approach to this 
information-gathering problem as described here consists of three phases: data validation, 
data aggregation and abstraction, and information interpretation. Each of these phases 
will be described in general, and for each of these phases we describe techniques that are 
reasonably generic to be applicable in many domains, but domain specific knowledge 
will of course always be needed too. 
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1. Introduction 
Effective action in any domain is necessarily founded on the availability of effective, 
timely and accurate decision-making information. In complex domains, however, the 
acquisition of such information is itself a complex task, and one that requires the 
application of specialised information-gathering processes performed by information-
gathering agencies. This need becomes particularly evident when the domain is highly 
dynamic, and raw data and the information derived from it must be filtered to extract just 
that information required to make the decisions the situation demands.  
At a geopolitical level, in military contexts and even in the business world the need for 
such information-gathering agencies (where they are termed ‘intelligence agencies’ or 
‘intelligence services’) has long been recognised; at a smaller scale, or in civilian 
contexts, while their need is no less pressing, lack of resources often leads to inadequate 
provision of these services. To redress this balance, the authors have, in the FireGrid 
project [1], been exploring the use of new technologies to provide (semi-) automated 
decision-making support for fire-fighters tackling an emergency incident within a 
complex, sensitive or otherwise high-value building. 
In the next section we will give a brief overview of the FireGrid system and the problem 
it addresses. We will then go on to describe the information-gathering problem as 
encountered in FireGrid in more detail. The contribution of this paper is the three phase 
approach to the information-gathering described next: data validation, abstraction and 
interpretation. We shall describe general techniques that we expect to be applicable in the 
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respective phases and illustrate these with examples from fire experiments conducted in 
FireGrid.  
2. FireGird: Emergency Response Support for Complex Fires 
The FireGrid project [1] represents a farsighted attempt to harness recent advances in a 
number of disparate fields for the express purpose of assisting responders to tackle 
emergency incidents, in particular (but not exclusively so), complex building fires. 
Currently fire-fighters, when they arrive on the site of an incident, generally have to rely 
on the information provided by their own senses, any information that can be provided by 
evacuated occupants of the building in question and their experiences of previous fires in 
order to decide on an intervention course. In the UK, the initial decision is one of 
choosing the appropriate tactical mode for tackling the fire: this may be either offensive 
or defensive [2]. The former often involves sending fire-fighters into the building, a 
decision that is taken if the potential benefits are felt to outweigh the risks – for example, 
if people are thought to be trapped within the building and fire-fighters are felt to have a 
reasonable chance of rescuing them while being exposed to an acceptable level of risk. 
Defensive mode, on the other hand, is adopted when the trade-off of the potential benefit 
against the likely risk of offensive mode is not thought favourable (or, in some situations, 
where the current lack of information means that the benefits or risks cannot yet be 
assessed). 
Hence, the intervention decision can be based on incomplete or faulty information; in 
particular, for large-scale and complex buildings, fire-fighters are rarely aware of the 
exact conditions within the building. Moreover, the lack of experience of complex fires 
that many fire-fighters have (simply because such fires occur relatively rarely), can mean 
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that, even when available, information is misinterpreted, and fire-fighters are placed in 
danger.  
Obviously this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. However, recent advances in three 
areas of technology, when exploited together, suggest a possible solution to this problem: 
• Developments in sensor technology, along with a reduction in unit cost, offer the 
prospect of deploying large-scale, robust and cost-effective sensor networks 
within buildings; 
• Advances in the understanding of fire and related phenomena have resulted in 
sophisticated computer models which might be used to interpret sensor data; 
• The availability of Grid resources and infrastructure promises to enable these 
(usually extremely time- and resource-hungry) models to be run in real-time, 
making their use in emergencies a practical proposition. 
The FireGrid vision is to combine these technologies in a system, underpinned by 
concepts and techniques drawn from Artificial Intelligence, that essentially provides an 
‘intelligence service’ for fire-fighters. 
2.1 The FireGrid Software Architecture 
The architecture of the FireGrid system is presented from a command and control (C2) 
perspective here as this is the aspect that is intended to directly support decision makers. 
The role of the C2 layer of a FireGrid system is, in brief, to provide a means for users to 
interact with the system and steer it towards achieving their goal – which, in a deployed 
system, would be to help with the safe and successful management of fire incidents in the 
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building in question. The unique aspect of a FireGrid system is the capture of ‘live’ 
sensor data from the building and the use of this data by models to interpret the status and 
projected course of the incident for emergency responders. Figure 1 shows the 
components of the C2 layer. 
There are two primary human interfaces onto the C2 layer, namely the Building C2 
(BC2) interface, and the e-Response C2 (eRC2) interface. The role of these interfaces is 
to provide their human users with information about the current state of the system (and 
hence about the state of any incident and of the response to it), and to assist users to 
interact with system components to acquire additional information or actuate some 
response. 
The two types of C2 interfaces differ in their applicability, coverage and scope. A BC2 
interface is specific to a particular FireGrid system, and is tailored towards that system 
and the building it relates to. Its projected user is someone who has responsibility for 
monitoring the state of the building in question and, in the event of an incident, for 
instigating initial response activities (such evacuating the building), but would not be 
expected to tackle anything but the most trivial of fires. 
The eRC2 interface, on the other hand, contains knowledge of agents (such as fire-
fighters) and resources (such as standard operating procedures) that are external to any 
specific FireGrid system, and which may be required when the response to incident has to 
be escalated beyond the local (that is, BC2) level. The eRC2 interface is intended to be 
installed on, for instance, the computer system in an emergency response command 
vehicle; when the vehicle arrives at the site of the incident, it ‘taps into’ the in situ 
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FireGrid system to access and request information about the incident. The projected user 
of the eRC2 interface is (using UK terminology) a Fire Incident Commander, or – more 
likely – a Support Officer detailed to assist the Incident Commander. The Incident 
Commander is responsible for the management of the incident, including tactical 
planning, coordination and resource deployment [2]. 
2.2 Decision Support using Intelligent Agents 
Underlying the C2 interface components in FireGrid are intelligent agents that are based 
on the I-X framework [4][7]. I-X provides a generic systems architecture (and tool suite) 
for multi-agent process support, structured upon an abstract activity-centred ontology for 
expressing information and communications within the system. While this approach has 
its foundations in work in AI planning, it is intended for use in systems of collaborating 
human and computer agents. 
The “intelligence” of an I-X agent stems from a set of standard operating procedures 
encoded by domain experts. These procedures correspond to the structures called 
methods in the planning literature [3]. Methods formally describe how a specific task can 
be broken down into sub-tasks. The definition of a method consists of four main parts: 
task pattern, name, constraints and network. 
The task pattern of a method is used for matching methods to items in the activity list, the 
“to-do” list of the user that describes the current problems that must be addressed. The 
name can be used to refer to the method and thus to distinguish the different methods 
available to address the same task. Methods applicable to the same task are options which 
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require a decision from the user. The network contains the list of sub-tasks that will be 
added as activities when the method is chosen.  
The constraints are used to decide whether a method is applicable in the current context. 
Hence, the constraints provide a formal way for the experts in the field to stipulate the 
conditions under which a method/standard operating procedure is valid, and as such they 
form part of the information about the environment and state of the task required by the 
decision maker in order to decide how to tackle a given problem. Furthermore, since 
these constraints have been provided by an expert we can assume that they will be at a 
level of abstraction that is relevant and meaningful to the task in hand. Thus, we shall 
assume that such constraints describe the kind of information that is the objective of 
information-gathering – in other words, it is the target output of the information-
gathering process. 
3. The Information-Gathering Problem 
In our approach, the information that needs to be gathered is described by the constraints 
associated with different methods in an I-X agent’s library of standard operating 
procedures. In FireGrid one source of the information that is available about the 
environment comes in the form of sensor readings that provide large amounts of 
dynamically changing data. In this case, then, the information-gathering process needs to 
bridge this gap, taking as input this sensor data and generating as output the information 
relevant to a decision maker.  
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The data generated by the sensors and the information required by the decision maker can 
differ in a number of ways that need to be addressed by the information-gathering 
process; specifically they can differ in terms of: 
• Accuracy: decision makers require accurate information whereas sensors might 
fail and result in false readings. This is further complicated in a situation such as a 
fire incident in which sensors can be destroyed while information-gathering is 
taking place.  
• Concision: decision makers require concise information whereas large numbers 
of sensors can result in large numbers of sensor readings that directly reflect the 
quantities the sensors are measuring. 
• Timeliness: decision makers would like to base their decisions on the latest state 
of the environment; however, sensors operate only at a specific frequency, 
meaning that the data they provide might be out of date. 
• Meaningfulness: decision makers usually require information that corresponds to 
some generalised and task-specific interpretation of the current state of the 
environment whereas sensors provide objective ‘point-data’ that effectively 
constitute task-neutral, specific and localised truths. 
4. From Sensor Data to Decision Support 
In this section, we will describe our view of this information-gathering process, and our 
approach to the information-gathering problem. The process will be described in the 
abstract, regardless of context or domain, or even whether the actors in this process are 
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human or automated. We shall illustrate this approach through examples drawn from the 
FireGrid project and experiments conducted. In our approach the information-gathering 
process can be divided into three phases as follows: 
• Phase 1: Data validation 
Observations or facts are collected; and these must be verified. In the context of 
FireGrid these ‘observations’ are provided by the individual sensors within the 
building; since sensor data may be noisy, and faulty and failed sensors can 
provide incorrect readings (which will invariably happen in devastating fires as 
sensors are destroyed), these observations need to be ratified before they are 
passed onto the next phase. Similarly, in other contexts, ‘facts’ may be provided 
by humans, and attempts such should be made to validate or corroborate these 
before accepting their veracity. 
• Phase 2: Data aggregation and abstraction 
Usually – but not always – the observations/facts provided by phase 1 will need to 
be processed to provide information. In the context of FireGrid, the task during 
this phase is to condense the sheer quantity of sensor data into abstractions that 
are meaningful in the context. In computational terms, this is achieved by 
applying different analytical algorithms to the data; these algorithms can range 
from the simple – for example, selecting the maximum value from a 
contemporaneous set of readings from a co-located set of sensors – through more 
advanced data fusion algorithms, up to the highly complex – in the case of 
FireGrid, the application of models of the physics of fire spread to make 
predictions about the course of the fire. This phase is necessary when there is a 
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discrepancy between the content or expression of the data from phase 1 and the 
content or expression of the information required for decision support in phase 3; 
in complex or open systems, this will invariably be the case. The algorithms 
applied at this phase will typically be domain-dependent, and may well be 
formulated with the general task (such as emergency response) in mind, but will 
be independent (and oblivious) of the wider context for which the information is 
required. 
• Phase 3: Information interpretation 
The information derived from phase 2 (or, where appropriate, directly from phase 
1) must be further interpreted in the context of the state of the current activity and 
the available choices in order to select viable courses of action. Hence the 
information needs to be interpreted (and presented) in such a fashion as its 
relevance to the decision-maker and the task in hand is readily apparent, and 
which takes into account his/her particular knowledge and capabilities along with 
the specific circumstances and pressures under which he/she operates. In 
FireGrid, we support this task by providing a custom interface and underlying 
reasoning engine tailored to the needs of a particular decision-maker, representing 
graphically the afflicted building and onto which we superimpose relevant 
information. 
In any application, we would expect these phases to be applied cyclically (or, more 
likely, concurrently) until such time as all the goals of the decision-makers have been 
achieved. For our purposes we assume that the communication of data and information 
from phase to phase is noise- and error-free; obviously to make such an assumption in 
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any real situation would be dangerous. The last phase should be seamlessly integrated 
with the I-X system and its operating methodology as described above.  
4.1 Phase 1: Data Validation using Constraint Networks 
The first phase involves the gathering of data about the situation. For building fire 
incidents, fire-fighters will be continually taking in direct sensory perceptions of the 
incident, collecting and cross-checking statements by eye-witnesses, and so on. To 
augment this, a FireGrid system is intended to provide information about the state of the 
incident based on readings supplied periodically by a number of sensors of different types 
located within the building. These sensors can include, for instance, fire alarms, smoke 
detectors, thermocouples (for reading temperatures), CO and CO2 meters. Typically, 
these sensors will be polled in batch mode periodically by one or more data loggers, 
physical devices with which groups of sensors have some communications link; in this 
device and its accompanying software, the signals produced by the sensors will be 
converted into their corresponding quantities (so, for instance, the voltages read from the 
thermocouples will be converted into degrees Celsius). In modern systems, these steps 
are automatic, and at this point, these data values can be accessed and stored in a 
database. To do this, however, would be to mistakenly assume that all data values are 
correct. Since sensors (or their lines of communication) can be noisy or can fail because 
of manufacturing flaws or the extremes of the fire incident itself, the data first needs to be 
verified: this is the sensor grading task.  
In this section we will describe an algorithm that can be used for real-time sensor 
grading. The expected input is a batch of ‘raw’ sensor readings at some specific point in 
time. The algorithm then uses previously asserted constraints on the values of the 
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different sensors to find a set (which may be empty) of sensors that are considered to 
have failed or to be failing at that point in time (a sensor might cease to be reliable when 
conditions move outside its normal operating range; however, it is not necessarily the 
case that any subsequent reading from that sensor from that time onwards will be 
unreliable). Thus, the output of the algorithm is a binary value for each sensor, indicating 
whether the sensor reading is considered correct or not. 
To illustrate the algorithm we shall use a controlled fire experiment that was conducted at 
the University of Edinburgh in February 2008. In this experiment a tray containing a fuel 
source was placed in the middle of a small room. Around this fire were placed four 
vertical ‘trees’, each equipped with 10 thermocouples, allowing the measurement of the 
gas temperatures at different heights. The layout of the experiment and the sensors is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Thermocouple readings were taken at a rate of 2Hz and written to a file and database. 
The initial grading was performed by running some preliminary tests before the fire 
experiment and having a fire-engineering expert look at the resulting data. The expert 
then identified four of the 40 sensors as failing and they were excluded manually from 
further processing – in other words, in advance of the experiment these sensors were 
flagged so that their values would be ignored by the computational models that were to 
be applied to the data during the experiment. Clearly, this is not a satisfactory approach 
for a system that can support decisions during real fires, partly because it is not feasible 
to expect that sensors have been thoroughly tested just prior to a fire breaking out, and 
also because one should not assume sensors will remain undamaged during a fire. 
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The ungraded output from all the sensors at one time point consists of 40 floating point 
values representing temperatures in degrees Celsius. Table 1 illustrates the output from 
the sensors, the data arranged in columns corresponding to each sensor tree, and with 
each sensor identified by the unique label shown. Each tree contains 10 thermocouples, 
with the first sensor located 40cm above the ground and the others spaced evenly above 
this to the ceiling of the room (note how the values of the readings increase as we move 
‘up’ each sensor tree, a result of the hot gases rising from the fire towards the ceiling). 
In addition to the readings for each sensor, the data grading algorithm takes as input a 
constraint network that expresses the expected relations among the sensor readings at any 
particular time. The simplest type of constraint is the unary constraint which can be used 
to express ranges in which a sensor is expected to operate (it is a unary constraint since it 
refers to the values of that sensor alone). For example, each of the thermocouples used in 
our fire experiment was expected to return values confined to the range 0°C to 2000°C, 
and this can be expressed through the following constraint (where ‘s’ is the reading of 
any particular sensor, i.e. of s1001, s1002…s1040.): 
(0 < s) and (s < 2000) 
The data grading algorithm starts by first evaluating each of the unary constraints against 
the latest batch of readings. If one of the constraints is violated, the corresponding 
reading is graded as unreliable. In the example data set, the reading provided by sensor 
s1009 in the first tree can be identified in this way as unreliable since its value (9.9E+37) 
breaks this constraint. 
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In addition to the unary constraints the algorithm can take more complex constraints that 
express relations involving more than one sensor value. For example, since the trees were 
equidistant from the fire, it is expected that sensors at the same height in the room will 
provide similar temperature values. This can be expressed by a set of binary constraints 
such as: 
(similar s1001 s1011) and  
(similar s1011 s1021) and  
(similar s1021 s1031) and  
(similar s1031 s1001) 
where the sensor identifiers, s1001 etc., refer to the readings of those sensors at some 
particular point in time. This constraint expresses the knowledge that all the sensors that 
are 40cm off the ground should have similar values. Respective constraints can be added 
for the 9 other heights, resulting in 40 different constraints. Note that this partially 
exploits the transitivity of the similarity relation as there is no constraint connecting 
s1001 with s1021 or s1011 with s1031. 
Another set of constraints can be used to express the fact that temperature is expected to 
rise as we move up each tree. This can be expressed by the following binary constraints: 
(s1001 < s1002) and  
(s1002 < s1003) and  
…  
(s1008 < s1009) and  
(s1009 < s1010) 
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That is, the reading of s1001 at some point in time should be less than that of s1002, 
which in turn should be less than that of s1003 and so on. The data grading algorithm will 
now attempt to use these binary constraints to derive which readings are unreliable. 
While the last set of constraints appears to be sufficient, the transitivity of the ‘<’ relation 
is not known to the algorithm and this leads to a minor issue. In the example above the 
values for the sensors s1002, s1003, and s1004 are 22.9, 21.5, and 26.2 respectively, 
meaning that temperature is not rising as expressed by the constraints. However, only one 
of the constraints is violated, namely (s1002 < s1003). The other constraint, 
(s1003 < s1004), is satisfied. In general, with only one constraint violated it is not 
possible to tell which of the two sensor readings involved is unreliable. This can be fixed 
by adding more domain specific knowledge or by adding more constraints. We have 
solved the problem by adding more constraints, making the transitivity relation more 
explicit: 
(s1001 < s1003) and  
(s1002 < s1004) and  
…  
(s1007 < s1009) and  
(s1008 < s1010) 
After processing the unary constraints, the algorithm now proceeds with the n-ary 
constraints. It first evaluates all those constraints that do not involve sensors whose 
readings at this time have already been identified as unreliable. If one such constraint is 
violated the algorithm collects the sensor labels in a set along with the number of times 
each is involved in a constraint violation. The reading of the sensor that violates the most 
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constraints is then graded as unreliable and the process is repeated until no more 
constraints are found to be violated. 
In the example used here, after having identified the reading of s1009 to be unreliable 
using the unary constraints, the algorithm now finds the readings of sensors s1013, s1007, 
and s1040 to have violated 4 constraints each. After their readings have been graded as 
unreliable, the reading of sensor s1036 is found to violate 2 constraints and is graded 
unreliable. As a result no more constraints are violated and the algorithm terminates, with 
the overall result as shown in Table 2 where unreliable readings are highlighted. 
This compares to sensors s1007, s1009, s1032, and s1040 that were identified by the 
expert as failing. The reading of sensor s1009 is clearly out of range and requires no 
further discussion. The readings of s1007, s1032, and s1040 appeared to the expert to be 
stuck at just over 20°C. The algorithm did not identify s1032 as faulty as this could well 
be correct in the situation given (but perhaps only by coincidence). The algorithm did 
however mark as unreliable the readings of two other sensors that were not identified by 
the expert. Comparing the reading of s1013 to the neighbouring values shows that it is 
indeed suspect. It may have worked better during the preliminary experiments or it may 
be correct and just show some unexplained random temperature peak – this cannot be 
verified now. Sensor s1036 only violates 2 constraints, indicating some lower degree of 
confidence on the part of the algorithm. The problem here is probably that this sensor is 
located at a height at which during this stage of the experiment the temperature is rapidly 
changing, making this reading look suspicious in the current context. 
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The overall algorithm can be summarized in pseudo-code as shown in Figure 3 (with a 
grading of 0 being used to indicate that a reading is unreliable). 
This algorithm could be improved further by adding a dynamic component to it. 
Currently, it looks at each batch of readings independently of the ones before and the 
ones after. However, a sensor that has been destroyed in a fire at one point in time is 
likely to remain destroyed for the future. Also, there are trends over time, e.g. a rise in 
temperature at a given sensor that could be used to grade its readings. Thus, it would 
make sense to carry such information from one batch to the next.  
4.2 Phase 2: Data Aggregation and Abstraction 
The problem for data grading is to identify in real time sensor readings that are 
unreliable. While this may reduce the amount of data available, this is not the aim. Data 
aggregation aims to reduce the amount of data by eliminating redundancy and lifting it to 
a higher level of abstraction. What this means is that a number of functions will be 
applied to derive new features from the given data. Often these features will be – or be 
very close to – information that is meaningful to the user. 
For example, one of the features that fire modellers (and fire-fighters) could be interested 
in is the smoke layer height in a room such as that used in the experiment described 
above. The smoke layer is the body of hot gas that collects near the top of a room. The 
smoke layer height is the distance from the ground to the bottom of the hot layer; when 
this descends too low, occupants are endangered and fire-fighting operations in the room 
become perilous. Given the sensor data above, the rise in temperature can be visualized 
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as shown in Figure 4Error! Reference source not found. (before data grading) and 
Figure 5Error! Reference source not found. (after data grading). 
In the case of the smoke layer height, then, the aim of data aggregation would be to 
process this data to derive a single number corresponding to the height of the layer. The 
first step in the data aggregation phase usually exploits and then eliminates any redundant 
data that is collected in order to corroborate values and so reduce noise.  
In our example we can use each group of four sensors that are located at the same height 
to compute the average temperatures at the ten different heights (once again with the 
underlying assumption that the trees are equidistant from the fire). The result is shown in 
Figure 6. The height of the smoke layer corresponds to the transition from the cooler 
temperatures of the lower region to the higher temperatures of the hot gases accumulating 
at the ceiling. For this example this point is reasonably easy to pinpoint visually in the 
graph of the averages; and in practice, we are looking for a ‘significant’ rising inflexion 
in the graph. This point is estimated using the second derivative of the average values 
with respect to height; with allowances made for local deviations in the averages, in this 
example the ‘most significant’ zero crossing of the second derivative is found to occur at 
approximately 1.48m– which gives us a value for the smoke layer height. 
This example illustrates how averaging can be used to remove redundancy from the data 
and the use of mathematical models to derive new features that are not directly available 
from the data. The result of this phase should still be numeric data, but the amount of data 
should be much lower and describe the situation in terms of features that are much closer 
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to the features needed by the decision maker – the preconditions in the I-X activity 
model. 
4.3 Phase 3: Information Interpretation for Decision Support 
The third phase of our intelligence gathering model involves interpreting the information 
that is provided from the earlier phases in the very particular context of the task in hand. 
This interpretation is performed to establish what – if anything – this information means 
for the task, what effect it has, and how it constrains current and future actions. This task 
obviously requires intelligence (in information processing terms) in order to understand 
what the relevance of the information and the implications it has for activity in this 
domain. In many contexts this intelligence will be human in nature, relying on the 
knowledge and experience of the decision-makers and their support teams to relate the 
information to their own situation. An alternative or supplementary approach is to 
augment this human intelligence with computational tools; this becomes increasingly 
relevant as the amount or complexity of the incoming information grows. In this section 
we will illustrate this phase of the intelligence gathering task through the example of a 
computer system based on artificial intelligence ideas. 
For the FireGrid project, this decision-support functionality is provided through a 
purpose-built Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) tool intended 
for use by the fire incident commander (or, more likely, by a fire-fighter acting in a role 
supporting the commander). The interface provided by this tool, developed with advice 
from serving fire-fighters, displays the interpretations of incoming information in a 
manner that is intended to make their relevance to the task of continuously determining 
the most appropriate tactical mode immediately apparent. Note that other interfaces, 
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intended for other groups of people (say, medical staff, or occupants of the building) with 
other tasks (treatment of casualties or safe evacuation of the building) could be developed 
that would interpret and present the same information in entirely different ways; this is an 
important point, and goes some way to justifying the division – in theory if not always in 
practice – between the second and third phases of the intelligence gathering model 
presented here. 
The primary role of this interface, then, is to convey succinctly and rapidly to the incident 
commander the current ‘hazard level’ at each location within the building. ‘Hazard level’ 
is a concept we introduce that is intended to express an integrated measure of the degree 
of risk to which a fire-fighter operating within that location would be exposed. The 
hazard level is expressed using a ‘traffic light’ for each location, where a green light 
should be interpreted as “the system is unaware of any specific hazard to fire-fighters 
operating under normal safe systems of work at this location”, amber as “additional 
control measures may need to be deployed to manage hazards at this location” and red as 
“this location may be dangerous for fire-fighters”. Each of these indicators is relevant to a 
particular location; the definition and extent of a location will be determined by the 
standard practice and procedures deployed by the task in hand; these may not correspond 
to the physically differentiated spaces (rooms, corridors, stairwells) within the building 
itself. In addition to the current hazard level, a traffic light may also concurrently display 
a second colour, when information is received to the effect that the hazard level in that 
location is predicted to worsen. When this happens, the ‘worse’ of the two lights shown 
indicates the predicted future hazard level (so, for instance, a traffic light simultaneously 
showing both amber and red lights indicates that the current hazard level at that location 
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is “amber”, and that it is predicted to become “red” at some time in the future). In this 
manner, the traffic light system adopted expresses both the current state of a location and 
how this state is expected to develop in time, vital information for assessing the 
appropriateness of current activities and for planning future activities. In addition to this, 
the floor of locations where fire has been detected is coloured red to provide the 
fundamental information of the fire position and spread. Figure 7 shows this interface. 
The hazard level measure represents an abstract attribute integrating the various 
individual current and future hazards that can be inferred to exist from the incoming 
information. The secondary role of the interface is to provide textual (and hyperlinked) 
information about these individual hazards, and, more generally, about the state of each 
location in the building in a pop-up window. A ‘time-slider’ provides the user with a 
means of exploring predicted hazards; by dragging the slider to any point within a 15-
minute timeframe, he/she can see the hazards that are predicted to be occurring at that 
time. (15 minutes is chosen for the timeframe in this case as this is the furthest time that 
the available models look into the future.) Figure 8 and Figure 9 show this pop-up 
display. 
Consideration of these individual present and future hazards leads us to a consideration of 
the reasoning underpinning this interface. The reasoning engine operates with two basic 
concepts: beliefs, propositions about some time at some location which are held by the 
system to be true, and rules, general expressions of the inferences that can be deduced 
from believed premises. The reasoning works in the following manner: 
1. models send messages to the C3I tool; 
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2. the C3I tool revises its beliefs in the light of the information contained in each 
new message; 
3. the C3I tool applies its set of rules to its revised beliefs to draw new conclusions; 
4. the C3I interface is updated to reflect any changes. 
Alongside this continual cycle of revising and updating, the tool must periodically revise 
its beliefs in the light of the passage of time. 
To explain what this all means, we first consider the content of these messages. A 
message describes its source and the time it was created along with some content which 
will be the description of the state of some location at some time. An example might be 
“message from smoke-layer-height-model at 12:54:32: smoke-layer-height = 1.2m in 
room-A at 12:54:32”. The state description here consists of a value (expressed in 
conventional units) for a given state parameter (smoke-layer-height), one of a number of 
such state parameters. Instead of a state parameter, this description might have referred to 
the occurrence of an event (such as collapse); state parameters and events are defined in 
the ontology for the system. An ontology is a formal, agreed definition of the concepts 
that occur in the context of the task in hand, along with descriptions of relationships 
between these concepts. For building a system such as that described here, which ranges 
over a number of different fields of expertise – sensor technology, fire modelling, fire 
fighting – an ontology becomes an almost vital tool for establishing the appropriate 
terminologies, for defining relationships between the different areas of expertise and later 
for integrating the various technologies into a coherent whole (for example by providing 
a formal language for expressing messages). In most cases, ontology construction 
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requires manual knowledge engineering to establish the terms and achieve consensus 
among available experts. 
For FireGrid, the ontology contains terms related to the physical phenomena surrounding 
fire, and, important in this case, how these relate to space and time. This gives us the 
high-level distinction between state parameters, quantities that are (in theory at least) 
continuously measurable for some place and time, and events, instantaneous occurrences 
at some location. The subclasses of these two categories (such as smoke layer height and 
collapse respectively) correspond to concepts that are both potentially of interest to fire-
fighters and that can be derived from the available data with the use of models. In 
addition, the hazard levels (and their definitions) constitute part of this ontology, and the 
rules that relate them to values of state parameters or events represent “axioms” of the 
ontology. 
The name and time of the message help the C3I tool to assess the effect that the message 
content should have on its current beliefs. A belief is a state description or hazard level 
that is taken by the tool to be true for some location and over some durations (hence, 
beliefs have start and end times). In addition, every belief must have one or more 
justifications, indicating the rationale for believing it. A justification might be a message 
(if that is the basis for the belief) or the combination of the rule and the beliefs which, 
taken together, allowed the belief to be deduced. 
When a new message arrives, it has to be considered in the context of existing beliefs. If, 
for example, the tool currently believed nothing about the smoke-layer-height in room-A 
and received the example message given above at 12:54:32 (or, more likely, some time 
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soon after this, since there will be delays due to information processing and message 
passing) and assuming that the source of the message (that is the smoke-layer-height-
model) is trusted, this message would be the justification for the tool believing the 
contents of the message. Moreover, since nothing else is known about the values of this 
state parameter in this location, the reasoning would assign a duration to this belief 
stretching from the current time to some indefinite time in the future (that is, since the 
reasoning engine does not believe otherwise, it assumes that the values of state 
parameters persist, and hence in this case the smoke layer height is believed to remain at 
1.2m indefinitely). 
If, on the other hand, something is already believed either about the current or future 
values of the smoke-layer-height, then a more complex train of reasoning begins, which 
attempts to reconcile this message with the existing belief(s). This may involve adjusting 
durations of beliefs or, where there seems to be a contradiction, choosing to adopt one or 
other of the possibilities and disregarding the other. This might be done on the basis of, 
say, one source being ‘more trusted’ than another or due to the general principle of 
favouring beliefs based on more recent information as being more likely to be true. 
Contradictions of this sort occur when there exist inconsistent state descriptions about the 
same location at the same time; due to the inherent lags and delays between values being 
read at the sensors and processed information arriving at the C3I tool, the tool must adopt 
some fairly relaxed definition of what is meant by “same time” (in this case descriptions 
that have (start) times within 30 seconds of one another are assumed to be referring to the 
same time).  
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A further complexity arises since the content of a message may be a prediction – that is it 
purports to describe the state of some location at some future time. While this might be 
adopted as a belief with a duration as before, the inexorable flow of time will mean that, 
assuming this belief has not been retracted in the meantime, at some time the prediction 
will refer to the current time, and in the absence of other information a choice must be 
made about whether or not to accept the predicted value as an actual current value. While 
reasoning of this sort is difficult to justify on grounds of logical soundness, it can be 
justified on the basis of a cautious approach to the safety of fire-fighters. 
Assuming that the set of beliefs has been revised and is consistent, the next step is to 
apply the set of rules to these beliefs. There are, generally speaking, two types of rules: 
hazard rules and physical rules. Rules represent expert knowledge about fire-fighting 
capabilities and practice (hazard rules) and the nature and progress of fire and associated 
physical phenomena (physical rules). An example hazard rule might be: 
IF smoke-layer-height < 1.5m THEN hazard level = amber 
An example physical rule might be: 
 IF smoke-layer-height < 1.0m THEN max-temperature > 80°C 
In each case, a rule consists of one or more conditions and a single conclusion. In the 
case of a hazard rule, the conclusion is an interpretation of the conditions in terms of the 
hazard level for the time and place in question; in the case of a physical rule, the 
conclusion is a state description that should be consistent with the current set of beliefs 
for that time and place (where consistency, in this sense, may entail the addition or 
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modification of beliefs). In addition, a hazard rule – especially one that refers to less 
commonly encountered hazards – may have an associated explanation and 
recommendations. So, for instance, a rule referring to excessive CO levels may offer the 
explanation that CO levels in that range can “cause headache, fatigue and nausea” 
alongside the recommendation to “avoid prolonged exposure or consider the use of 
breathing apparatus”. 
For each rule, then, a search is made in the set of beliefs for subsets that both satisfy the 
conditions and are contemporaneous (that is, which have overlapping durations). If such a 
subset exists, then the conclusion of the rule can be drawn. An inferred hazard level 
results in a new belief (or in the modification of an existing hazard level belief with an 
additional justification), with a duration delimited by the latest start time and earliest end 
time among the subset of beliefs satisfying the conditions. An inferred state description 
results in a similar modification to the existing beliefs about state descriptions. 
Finally, since the application of the rules may have resulted in the inference of multiple 
simultaneous hazard levels, the inference engine must collate these into a single hazard 
level for each location at every time. This is a (relatively) straightforward matter of 
determining the ‘worst’ hazard level that is believed to apply. So, for instance, if from the 
state of room-A at the current time, two “amber” hazards and one “red” hazard had been 
inferred, then the current overall hazard level of room-A is “red”, and this is displayed in 
the corresponding traffic light (A similar search through future states provides future 
hazards for concurrent display on the traffic light and on the time slider.) 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have characterized the information-gathering problem as bridging the 
gap between ‘raw’ sensor data and information used by decision makers. The input to the 
information gathering process is hence defined by the available sensors, and the desired 
output is defined by the precondition constraints to the standard operating procedures in 
an I-X agent’s domain model.  
We have described the information-gathering process as a three-phase procedure that 
decomposes the overall problem into phases requiring different types of knowledge and 
information processing capabilities. The first phase, data validation, aims to remove 
incorrect information from the input data, thereby creating a consistent view of the 
current situation. The second phase, data abstraction and aggregation, applies 
mathematical models to reduce the amount of data, remove noise from the data, and 
derive features that are closer to the terminology of the user. The third phase, information 
interpretation, uses a belief revision and rule-based approach to make the information 
actionable for the decision maker. 
In addition to this three-phase information-gathering process, we have identified 
reasonably general techniques that we expect to be applicable in general, not just in the 
FireGrid scenario we have used to illustrate our approach. In phase 1 the general idea is 
to specify constraints between sensors that must be satisfied for the resulting set of 
readings to be consistent. A greedy algorithm is used to grade sensor readings until 
maximally large and consistent set of values remains. Phase 2 requires mathematical 
modelling techniques that will often be domain specific, but statistical methods, for 
example, provide a toolset that can be expected to be applicable in many domains to 
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remove redundancy and noise. Finally, phase 3 is based on a rule-based system that 
reasons over space and time, maintaining a set of beliefs and their justifications to supply 
an application-specific user interface with relevant information. 
The evaluation of any system that provides support during large-scale emergencies is a 
difficult task, of course. This is because such emergencies happen relatively rarely and 
they tend to vary quite a lot. Setting up experiments on the same scale is very costly, if at 
all possible. Thus, we have used a number of small, controlled fires to evaluate our 
approach. The result shows that our system performs well and output corresponds to 
information generated by experts in hindsight.  
We have argued that the results of the information-gathering process as described here, 
presented in the context of an activity-centric model of an incident, represent a vital 
source of the sort of accurate, concise, timely and meaningful information that decision 
makers need to make the right choices under difficult conditions. 
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Height Tree 1 labels 
Tree 1 
readings 
(°C) 
Tree 2 
labels 
Tree 2 
readings 
(°C) 
Tree 3 
labels 
Tree 3 
readings 
(°C) 
Tree 4 
labels 
Tree 4 
readings 
(°C) 
0.4m s1001 22.9 s1011 24.8 s1021 22.4 s1031 20.5 
0.6m s1002 22.9 s1012 24.9 s1022 22.2 s1032 20.2 
0.8m s1003 21.5 s1013 34.2 s1023 21.5 s1033 20.5 
1.0m s1004 26.2 s1014 29.4 s1024 26.2 s1034 23.5 
1.2m s1005 29.4 s1015 30.6 s1025 26.6 s1035 27.9 
1.4m s1006 42.2 s1016 35.9 s1026 40.9 s1036 31.8 
1.6m s1007 21.1 s1017 69.8 s1027 77.9 s1037 84.6 
1.8m s1008 72.1 s1018 76.9 s1028 79.4 s1038 85.4 
2.0m s1009 9.9x1037 s1019 80.5 s1029 83.9 s1039 87 
2.2m s1010 82.2 s1020 90.6 s1030 88.7 s1040 21.9 
Table 1. Sample thermocouple (sensor) readings at a particular point in time for each of the sensors 
in each ‘tree’ of the fire experiment. 
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Height Tree 1 labels 
Tree 1 
readings 
(°C) 
Tree 2 
labels 
Tree 2 
readings 
(°C) 
Tree 3 
labels 
Tree 3 
readings 
(°C) 
Tree 4 
labels 
Tree 4 
readings 
(°C) 
0.4m s1001 22.9 s1011 24.8 s1021 22.4 s1031 20.5 
0.6m s1002 22.9 s1012 24.9 s1022 22.2 s1032 20.2 
0.8m s1003 21.5 s1013 34.2 s1023 21.5 s1033 20.5 
1.0m s1004 26.2 s1014 29.4 s1024 26.2 s1034 23.5 
1.2m s1005 29.4 s1015 30.6 s1025 26.6 s1035 27.9 
1.4m s1006 42.2 s1016 35.9 s1026 40.9 s1036 31.8 
1.6m s1007 21.1 s1017 69.8 s1027 77.9 s1037 84.6 
1.8m s1008 72.1 s1018 76.9 s1028 79.4 s1038 85.4 
2.0m s1009 9.9x1037 s1019 80.5 s1029 83.9 s1039 87 
2.2m s1010 82.2 s1020 90.6 s1030 88.7 s1040 21.9 
Table 2. As Table 1, but now highlighting those sensor readings that the data validation algorithm 
has graded as unreliable. 
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Figure 1: The FireGrid system architecture from a C2 perspective. Arrows show principal 
communication flows only, with inter-agent communications indicated by solid arrows. 
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Figure 2: Layout of smoke-box with instrumentation. 
 36
for every unary constraint c(s) do 
if not holds(c(s)) then 
grade(s) = 0 
do 
for every n-ary constraint c(s1, …, sn) do 
if holds(c(s1, …, sn)) then 
continue with next constraint 
if exists s in (s1, …, sn) such that grade(s) = 0 then 
continue with next constraint 
for every s in (s1, …, sn) do 
increase violation-count(s) 
s = sensor with highest violation-count 
if violation-count(s) > threshold then 
grade(s) = 0 
until violation-count(s) • threshold 
 
 
Figure 3: Pseudo code for constraint-based data grading algorithm 
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Figure 4: Sensor readings from each tree in Table 1Table 1 plotted against sensor height. 
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Figure 5: Graded sensor readings from each tree in Table 2 plotted against sensor height. 
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Figure 6: Processed sensor readings showing averages, first derivative and second derivative. 
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Figure 7: C3I tool interface for 4-room (and 4-location) building, with "traffic light" for each 
location: in this case the green traffic lights indicate that fire-fighters can operate in every location; 
however, the red floor in the room under the cursor indicates that a fire has been detected there. 
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Figure 8: At a later time, the user has selected more details about the state of the ‘fire’ room: the 
current hazard level is now “amber”, due to the combination of belief and rule shown. Moreover the 
traffic light (and the time slider) indicate that there is a future “red” hazard level predicted (for 
approximately 6 minutes into the future). 
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Figure 9: At a still later time, the hazard level is now “red” (and has deteriorated in the other 
locations), and the presence of multiple hazards is indicated by the rules. Note the explanation and 
recommendations attached to one of the rules. 
 
 
